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1  Stare decisis is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, and may be 
translated as "to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters."1 In Gulliver's Travels, the 
English satirist Johnathan Swift had Gulliver say: 
 
 It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may le-
gally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the deci-
sions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. 
These under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the 
most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of decreeing accordingly.2 
While the notion that Canadian appellate judges slavishly adhere to outdated precedent in a manner 
contrary to "common justice and the general re ason of mankind" does not accurately describe the 
current reality, there remains a lively and important debate about the functions, values and limits of 
"abiding by things decided" in common law systems.3 In this vein, Justices Steel and Freedman in 
the recent R. v. Neves4 decision stated: 
 
 The principle of stare decisis is a bedrock of our judicial system. There is great 
value in certainty in law, but there is also, of course, an expectation that the law 
as expounded by judges will be correct, and certainly not knowingly incorrect, 
which would result when a decision felt to be wrong is not overruled. The tension 
when these basic principles are in conflict can be profound.5 
2  This paper examines some key aspects of the contemporary treatment of precedent in Canada, 
including consideration of the vertical convention of precedent (lower courts being bound by deci-
sions of higher courts) and the horizontal convention of precedent (courts being willing and/or able 
to overrule or depart from decisions of the same court). On the latter topic of horizontal precedent, 
particular attention will be paid to three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ontario 
Court of Appeal, and Manitoba Court of Appeal respectively, which take a more functional and 
pragmatic approach to the issue and demonstrate a greater willingness to overrule decisions now 
thought to be wrong. Additional issues and controversies, such as the precedential weight of obiter 
dicta (particularly dicta of the Supreme Court of Canada) will be examined along the way. 




3  In the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision, David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. The Dominion 
of Canada General Insurance Co.,6 Justice John Laskin aptly summarized the key tension in this de-
bate by citing two eminent jurists: 
 
 Lord Denning once wrote, "The doctrine of precedent does not compel your 
Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff," to 
which Justice Brandeis might have replied: "It is usually more important that a 
rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right."7 
Justice Laskin went on to say: 
 
 The values underlying the principle of stare decisis are well known: consistency, 
certainty, predictability and sound judicial administration. Adherence to prece-
dent promotes these values. The more willing a court is to abandon its own pre-
vio us judgments, the greater the prospect for confusion and uncertainty... People 
should be able to know the law so that they can conduct themselves in accor-
dance with it.8 
However, rigid adherence to precedent, particularly in the face of changing values and social reali-
ties--not to mention new information that may cast doubt on the correctness or workability of an 
earlier decision--does little to foster confidence in the judicial process, as the quote from Gulliver's 
Travels demonstrates. Judges are not mere technicians, mechanically applying established rules to a 
given case without consideration of whether the rule remains apt or consistent with changing values 
or knowledge. It seems likely that confidence in the administration of justice is increased when 
courts are willing to candidly admit error or to address unforeseen implications of an earlier deci-
sion. 
4  The entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 has arguably 
strengthened the case for overruling earlier decisions that are inconsistent with the evolving inter-
pretation of various Charter rights. In the 2005 R. v. Henry9 decision, Binnie J. said for a unanimous 
Supreme Court: 
 
 The Court's practice, of course, is against departing from its prec edents unless 
there are compelling reaso ns to do so.... Nevertheless, while rare, departures do 
occur. In Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., it was said that "[t]his Court 
has made it clear that co nstitutional decisions are not immutable, even in the ab-
sence of constitutional amendment" and in the Charter context the Court in 
United States v. Burns effectively overturned the result (if not the reasoning) in 
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.). 
... The Court should be particularly careful before reversing a precedent where 
the effect is to diminish Charter protection.10 
5  As things have developed in Canada, the concept of "binding precedent" is limited to the vertical 
convention. Courts lower in the applicable hierarchy are bound to follow decisions of a higher 
court. The concept of stare decisis is used more broadly to apply to decisions of higher courts (the 
vertical convention) and to previous decisions of the same court, albeit often differently constituted 
(the horizontal convention). In the latter case decisions are not strictly binding, but should be fol-
lowed unless there are compelling reasons to overrule them. Finally, the concept of "persuasive au-
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thority" refers to all decisions of courts outside the direct hierarchy of the instant court. For exam-
ple, neither the Manitoba Court of Appeal nor the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench is bound to 
follow a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.11 In either case, the decision may be per-
suasive and may assist the court in coming to a decision, but stare decisis will not apply. 
 
II.  VERTICAL CONVENTION OF PRECEDENT 
6  The vertical convention of precedent, i.e., that lower courts must abide by decisions of courts 
above them in the hierarchy, is a key aspect of the common law system. By virtue of the vertical 
convention, all appellate courts, superior courts, federal courts, and provincial courts must follow 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. They must also follow pre-1949 decisions of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (J.C.P.C.) that have not been subsequently overruled by the Su-
preme Court of Canada. Since the J.C.P.C. was the final court of appeal for Canada until 1949, its 
decisions from that era are still vertically binding on all Canadian courts other than the Supreme 
Court of Canada. For the Supreme Court, pre-1949 J.C.P.C. decisions operate on the horizontal 
convention of precedent because the S.C.C. is now the final court of appeal, with the power to over-
rule its own decisions and those of the J.C.P.C.12 
 
1.  Binding Obiter Dicta? 
7  A significant limitation on the vertical convention of precedent is the reality that courts are only 
bound to follow "what was actually decided" in the earlier case.13 To use lawyer's Latin, this means 
that courts must follow the ratio decidendi, but not the obiter dicta, of the applicable case. As such, 
trial courts may refuse to follow certain aspects of a Supreme Court or provincial appellate court 
decision on the basis that the relevant part of the decision was obiter dicta. The line between ratio 
and obiter, however, is not always easy to draw. 
8  To make matters worse, significant confusion resulted from the so-called "Sellars principle" at-
tributed to Chouinard J. that obiter of the S.C.C. is binding.14 Revisiting this issue in the recent 
Henry decision, Binnie J. for the unanimous Supreme Court suggested that Chouinard J. never said 
such a thing.15 In citing an earlier decision of the S.C.C. on the issue of jury instructions, the English 
translation of the Chouinard opinion states "this is the inte rpretation that must prevail. As it does 
from time to time, the Court has thus ruled on the point, although it was not absolutely necessary to 
do so in order to dispose of the appeal."16 Writing extra-judicially, Justice Douglas Lambert of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal has suggested that much of the confusion surrounding Sellars 
arose from an error in translating the opinion from French to English (i.e., "should prevail" became 
"must prevail"), which was compounded by the English headnote writer overstating the point made 
by Chouinard J.;17 a cautionary tale concerning the reliance on headnotes, if ever there was one! 
9  In Henry, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the notion that the "Sellars principle" had rip-
ened into a rule of law to the effect that "whatever was said in a majority judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Canada was binding, no matter how incidental to the main point of the case or how far it 
was removed from the dispositive facts and principles of law."18 Having said that, and to put it col-
loquially, all obiter is not created equal. Or, to return to a point made earlier, the line between ratio 
and obiter is not always clear. It may be said that the narrow ratio of a case (i.e., that which is 
strictly necessary to the disposition of the particular case) is all that is binding. However, as Binnie 
J. points out in Henry, "[i]t would be a foolhardy advocate who dismissed Dickson C.J.'s classic 
formulation of proportionality in Oakes as mere obiter."19 Amendments to the Supreme Court Act 
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essentially limiting leave to appeal to matters of "public importance,"20 combined with the demands 
of Charter interpretation, have signaled a shift in the work of the Supreme Court from error correc-
tion toward the greater development of general analytical frameworks to be applied by lower 
courts.21 Therefore, while it is true, as Lord Halsbury L.C. said, "a case is only authority for what it 
actually decides,"22 determining what a case actually decided is an interpretive task in itself, and one 
that must be guided by first principles. Binnie J. attempted to give some guidance in Henry: 
 
 Beyond the ratio decidendi which, as the Earl of Halsbury L.C. pointed out, is 
generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this Court may be as nar-
row as the jury instruction at issu e in Sellars or as broad as the Oakes test. All 
obiter do not have, and are not intended to have, the same weight. The weight 
decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio decidendi to a wider circle of 
analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and which should be accepted 
as authoritative. Beyond that, there will be commentary, examples or exposition 
that are intended to be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are cer-
tainly not "binding" in the sense the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated 
form would have it. The objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the 
law, not to stifle its growth and creativity. The notion that each phrase in a judg-
ment of this Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by 
the cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the com-
mon law develops by experience.23 [emphasis added] 
10  Therefore, the dispositive ratio of the case is clearly binding and the "wider circle of analy-
sis...should be accepted as aut horitative." With respect, it is this sentence that muddies the waters 
somewhat. How, if at all, is "authoritative" different from "binding"? "Highly persuasive" might be 
a more apt description based on the metaphor of a core ratio and a penumbra of analysis that de-
creases in its precedential value with its distance from the core. 
11  On the facts of Henry, the language that some parties suggested might be interpreted as binding 
obiter from the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Noel24 included Justice Arbour's comment that cir-
cumstances enabling a Kuldip-type crossexamination of the accused might be "rare".25 This com-
ment was, as noted by Binnie J. in Henry, "neither part of the legal analysis nor a direction to trial 
courts. It was simply an observation by an experienced trial judge."26 While such comments proba-
bly cannot fairly be considered the "wider circle of analysis" on which the decision was based, law-
yers and lower court judges may still be wondering where this boundary lies. 
 
2.  Distinguishing a Precedent 
12  The most common "way around" the strict vertical convention is the process of distinguishing a 
precedent, a practice that is well-known to judges and lawyers. When faced with an apparent prece-
dent from the same or a higher court, any good advocate will examine the material facts of the ear-
lier case to determine how closely (or not) they align with those in the instant case. A case that is 
said to be "on all fours" with the case at bar is a precedent that cannot be distinguished. 
13  A variant of distinguishing is the practice of a subsequent court restating a precedent at a higher 
or lower level of generality so as to essentially render it inapplicable to the current case.27 This prac-
tice is sometimes called "restrictive distinguishing," meaning that the subsequent decision limits the 
ratio of the precedent by treating as material to the earlier decision some fact which may not have 
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been considered material in that case.28 Paul Perell cites the treatment of Anns Merton v. London 
Borough29 by the House of Lords in Peabody Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd .30 as an example of 
restrictive distinguishing: 
 
 The Anns case is cited as authority for the proposition that a municipality may be 
liable in negligence where it fails to properly inspect building plans. In the Pea-
body Fund case, by defining the duty of the municipality as being owed to own-
ers and occupiers threa tened with the possibility of injury to safety or health, the 
House of Lords specified and made less general, the scope of the municipality's 
responsibilit y as it had been defined in the Anns case. In the result, the Court did 
not allow a claim by the developer of a housing project who suffered damages 
when the municipality's drainage inspector failed to point out that the drainage 
system was not being installed in accordance with the approved design. Thus, in 
Peabody Fund the element of restrictive distinguishing is the introduction of the 
requirement of the possibility of in jury to safety or health.31 
 
3.  "Per incuriam" Decisions of a Higher Court? 
14  While on the English Court of Appeal, Lord Denning famously attempted to get around the ver-
tical convention of precedent by declaring that the relevant House of Lords decision was per incu-
riam (i.e., a decision "given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent authority binding on 
the court concerned"32). However, Lord Denning was strongly criticized by the House of Lords for 
doing so. In Davis v. Johnson, Lord Diplock described Lord Denning as having conducted "what 
may be described, I hope without offence, as a one-man crusade with the object of freeing the Court 
of Appeal from the shackles which the doctrine of stare decisis imposed upon its liberty of deci-
sion"33 and affirmed that the Court of Appeal was bound by decisions of the House of Lords, even 
ones that the C.A. considers to have been rendered per incuriam.34 The principle that a lower court 
cannot refuse to follow a higher court's decision on the basis that it was rendered per incuriam has 
been adopted by a number of Canadian appellate courts.35 However the strength of this principle 
seems to be eroding36 in cases where the per incuriam rule is confined to its narrow bounds and not 
used as a means to refuse to follow a precedent with which the lower court simply disagrees or be-
lieves to be wrong. 
 
4.  Examples of Non-Precedent 
15  Sometimes it is implied by counsel that certain decisions have precedential value, when in fact, 
they do not. For example, denial of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in a particular 
case does not accord any greater precedential weight to the Court of Appeal decision at issue.37 The 
same holds true for a trial decision where leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been denied. It 
is also sometimes erroneously asserted that courts should consider consent judgments as precedents. 
As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in a tax case, "a consent judgment represents an agreement 
of the parties and although it is entered upon the record with the approval of a court and is therefore 
binding as between the parties it does not create a precedent by which an inferior court is bound."38 
16  An evenly divided decision (i.e., a tie) in the Supreme Court of Canada will mean that the ap-
peal will be dismissed and the appellate court decision will stand as a precedent that has not been 
overruled.39 In the case of divided decisions or those where there is no clear majority, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that, while not standing as binding precedents, the reasons of the members of 
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the court supporting the result (i.e., upholding the court of appeal decision) are entitled to "great re-
spect."40 Of course, since the court sits in odd numbers,41 a tie only happens when a judge is ill, re-
tires, or dies. An example is Tutton v. Tutton,42 a 3-3 decision of the S.C.C. on whether fault for 
criminal negligence is assessed on a subjective or objective standard. Since the court was evenly 
divided on this issue, the Ontario Court of Appeal continued to apply the objective test as it had be-
fore.43 The S.C.C. has not clarified this issue explicitly when it has had occasion to do so,44 but some 
other provincial courts of appeal have pr oceeded on the assumption that the matter was resolved by 
the Supreme Court in favour of an objective standard.45 
 
5.  Anticipatory Overruling 
17  Keeping in mind the relatively strict vertical convention of precedent, is there any place for "an-
ticipatory overruling" whereby a lower court bound by precedent is firmly of the view that the 
higher court will overrule its own precedent when given the chance?46 Should a litigant have to bear 
the personal cost of pursuing an appeal to the higher court to "correct" the law by overruling a 
precedent that is out-of-step with more recent rulings not directly on point, but indicative of the 
court's changing approach? Strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to speak of this practice as anticipatory 
overruling, as it is simply impossible in our common law system for a lower court to "overrule" a 
higher court. It would be more accurate to describe the lower court's act as refusing to follow a 
precedent. 
18  An example cited by Esau of the problematic nature of the strict vertical convention is the On-
tario High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Marvco Color Research v. Harris47 dealing with 
the "non est factum" rule in contract law. In Marvco, the applicable Supreme Court of Canada 
precedent had been based on a House of Lords decision that had since been overruled by the House 
itself. Both lower courts were of the view that the Canadian precedent was bad law and was incon-
sistent with the law in other similar jurisdictions, yet they applied the law. Eventually, the case 
made its way to the Supreme Court and the law was changed as predicted. 
19  Dale Gibson argued in a case comment in 198048 that intermediate courts of appeal should have 
the power to "initiate the process of overruling" a higher court precedent that is believed to be 
wrong, at least in certain circumstances. He was referring to a decision of the Manitoba C.A. in R. 
v. Buchinsky,49 wherein the court refused to follow precedents of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the question of whether the Crown was entitled to bring a tort action "per quot servitium amisit" for 
damages suffered by a member of the armed forces. O'Sullivan J.A. maintained in the majority 
opinion that the issue had not been settled by the Supreme Court, yet later in the judgment he indi-
cated that he was prepared to depart from the S.C.C. precedent, in any event, stating: 
 
 The problem that arises in this case is not what was the law in respect of per quod 
thought to be in 1948 or in 1962 [the years of the S.C.C. precedents], but what is 
the law of Manitoba today?...We are...bound to apply the common law. But, as I 
understand it, the common law is not simply to be determined by strict adherence 
to precedents ...the common law is susceptible of development in light of chang-
ing circumstances, reconsideration of the reasons for a law, and the new light 
which is shed on old authorities by modern research.50 [emphasis added] 
20  Acknowledging the heretical nature of advocating any form of anticipatory overruling, Gibson 
quipped, "[t]oday's heresy is tomorrow's orthodoxy," and went on to discuss the benefits and disad-
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vantages of such a practice. He noted that while the strict vertical convention of precedent serves 
the interests of consistency and predictability of the law, "consistency is not the only component of 
justice"51 and argued that the "public is much more likely to respect a Court that is willing to be cor-
rected where its decisions can be shown to operate unfairly, than one which insists on blind subser-
vience to its rulings, right or wrong."52 Gibson emphasized that this power should be used sparingly, 
in fact only where there is a "strong likelihood" that the higher court will overrule its own prece-
dent. 
21  On the facts of Buchinsky, Gibson doubted that the Manitoba C.A. would be vindicated in the 
end, and he was correct in that prediction. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the C.A. 
and restored the trial judgment, noting that the trial judge had correctly interpreted "the decisions of 
this Court ... which are binding on the courts of Manitoba."53 While Gibson approved of the general, 
albeit heretical, principle behind anticipatory overruling, he correctly pointed out that it should be 
employed only in the clearest of cases. 
22  As discussed below, the Supreme Court of Canada seems increasingly willing to reconsider and 
overrule even recent decisions in the Charter era. In this context, it might be argued that the case for 
anticipatory overruling by intermediate courts is stronger than it might have been at the time Gibson 
wrote his case comment in 1980. However, the reality is that there are very few cases where it can 
truly be said that an overruling by the S.C.C. is very likely or inevitable (as opposed to the C.A. 
simply disagreeing with the precedent of the S.C.C.). 
23  While this issue has been rarely debated in Canada, in the United States there exists a long his-
tory of intermediate appellate courts disregarding applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedents, pre-
dicting that the higher court will eventually overrule itself. Until 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
not expressly disapproved of this practice, despite having a number of occasions on which it could 
have done so.54 However, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,55 the Court 
overruled an earlier precedent (as anticipated by various appellate courts), but all members of the 
court expressly decried the concept of anticipatory overruling. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
 We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have 
taken the step of renouncing Wilko. If a precedent of this Court has direct appli-
cation in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of deci-
sions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leav-
ing to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.56 
24  Therefore, for now, even in the U.S., anticipatory overruling has been rejected. 
 
III.  HORIZONTAL CONVENTION OF PRECEDENT 
25  The subject of when and how a court will overrule one of its own decisions has received consid-
erable attention in appellate courts across Canada, including the Supreme Court, in recent years. A 
classic case of a court overruling itself is the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,57 which overruled the separate but equal doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson58 and held that 
racially se gregated schools violated the Equal Protection guarantee in the U.S Constitution. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has generally been more willing to overrule itself than have some other high 
courts in the English common law tradition. In particular, the House of Lords strictly maintained the 
horizontal convention of precedent until 1966,59 refusing to recognize its own power to overrule its 
decisions and leaving it to Parliament to correct any decisions believed to be unjust or unwor kable. 
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However, it was in that year that the Lord Gardiner L.C. delivered the following statement on behalf 
of himself and the entire House: 
 
 Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon 
which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides 
at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct 
of their affairs, as well as a basis for the orderly development of legal rules. 
 
 Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent may 
lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict proper development 
of the law. They propose therefore to modify their practice and, while treating 
former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from previous de-
cisions when it appears right to do so. 
 
 In this connection they bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the 
basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have 
been entered into and also the special need for certainty in the criminal law. 
 
 This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than 
in this House.60 
26  This well-known statement captures the key tensions that arise when considering whether it is 
appropriate to overrule a precedent. On the one hand, there is the quest for certainty and predictabil-
ity, which is seen as particularly important in private law matters where parties have relied on a par-
ticular statement of the law in ordering their affairs. Underlying the House of Lords previous posi-
tion against overruling was the notion that once a matter has been determined, it should be left to 
the democratically elected legislature to change it. However, on the other side of the equation, Lord 
Gardiner L.C. acknowledges that strict adherence to precedent can lead to injustice (particularly 
where Parliament does not step in to redress a known problem or defect in the law). In addition, 
there is an allusion to the fact that without recognizing the power to overrule, our highest courts' 
law-making role would be "limited to 'filling in gaps' rather than moulding and updating the com-
mon law to keep abreast of social needs or abstract demands for better justice in the law."61 
27  A recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lewis v. Attorney General 
of Jamaica62 reveals that there are still those who maintain the view that a final court of appeal's own 
precedent should be followed, even when that court believes the precedent to be wrongly decided.63 
In Lewis, a majority of the J.C.P.C. overruled its own precedents on a variety of issues relating to 
judicial review of the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy in death penalty cases. In dissent, 
Lord Hoffman stated that he believed the precedents limiting the availability of judicial review in 
such cases were correctly decided. However, he went on to state that even if he believed them to be 
wrongly decided, the precedents should nevertheless be followed. In a case literally concerned with 
whether people lived or died, and given the trend in final courts of appeal in recent years,64 this is an 
anomalous view.65 As discussed below, such a strict approach to the horizontal precedent has been 
rejected in Canada, both at the Supreme Court and provincial appellate court level. 
28  Even those who maintain a strict view of the horizontal convention in final courts of appeal 
generally recognize the power to distinguish or refuse to follow a precedent where factual circum-
stances or legal principles have changed since it was decided, where it was held to be per incuriam, 
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or where it has been found to be unworkable in practical application.66 The difficulty arises where 
none of these criteria are met, yet the later court simply considers the precedent to be wrong. As de-
scribed by Bruce Harris, "[w]here the precedent is considered to be merely wrong, the later final 
appellate court believes that the earlier decision should have been reasoned in an alternative way to 
produce a more just result."67 
29  The idea that, in such cases, a subsequent court should not substitute its own view of the matter 
for that of the earlier court has been described as the "no new reasons" justification for maintaining 
stare decisis,68 and may, in some courts, be relied on as a presumption against overruling a "merely 
wrong" precedent. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeas tern Pennsylvania et al. v. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al., O'Connor, Kennedy 
and Souter JJ. said, in referring to the precedent of Roe v. Wade on abortion, the Court could not 
pretend to be reexaming the prior law with any just ification beyond a present doctrinal disposition 
to come out differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule prior law for no other reason than that 
would run counter to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to overrule should rest on some 
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.69 
30  Harris has reviewed the trend in final common law courts of appeal toward a greater willingness 
to overrule their own precedents.70 He argues forcefully for the reversal of the presumption against 
overruling "merely wrong" precedents in favour of a presumption that wrong precedents should be 
overruled "unless their retention can be justified in the circumstances by overriding stare decisis 
values."71 Ultimately, he argues for a transparent exercise of discretion to depart from precedent af-
ter balancing the competing interests at stake. The court should weigh the consequences of perpetu-
ating a wrong precedent against the values, when examined in context, of observing stare decisis. 
Harris has added to the traditional justifications for overruling a precedent and put forward the fol-
lowing eight considerations relevant to a decision to overrule or defer: 
 
(i)  whether the precdent can be distinguished based on changing facts or law; 
 
(ii)  whethere the precedent was reached per incuriam; 
 
(iii)  whether precedent has proved unworkable; 
 
(iv)  whether any reasons have been advanced on appeal which were not considered in 
the earlier case (going beyond the standard for per incuriam)' 
 
(v)  whether the later court now views the precedent to be wrong (i.e., the court now 
gives different weight or priority to the considerations weighed in the earlier 
case); 
 
(vi)  whether the vales underlying error correction or "doing justice" as it is now per-
ceived outweigh the values advanced to by adherence to stare decisis (here is 
where the presumption would now be in favour of correction); 
 
(vii)  whether the perceived error or injustice is likely to be swiftly corrected by the 
legislature (note that where interpretation of a written constitution is involved, 




(viii)  whether fundamental principles of human and civil rights are involved. 
31  As we shall see, the latter consideration has contributed to a greater willingness on the part of 
the Supreme Court of Canada to overrule precedents in the Charter era. In addition, Canadian appel-
late courts have adopted a pragmatic balancing approach of the benefits and disadvantages of over-
ruling a precedent (Harris' sixth consideration) and seem to be moving toward a presumption that 
"merely wrong" precedents should be overruled, absent compelling considerations to the contrary. 
 
1.  Supreme Court of Canada 
32  From the time appeals from the S.C.C. to the J.C.P.C. were abolished in 1949, the incremental 
process of the S.C.C. developing a uniquely Canadian body of law was underway,72 and this process 
included the court becoming more comfortable with the practice of distinguishing and, eventually, 
overruling precedents.73 Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980's, the Supreme Court of Canada 
demonstrated a willingness to overturn its own (or pre-1949 J.C.P.C.) precedents where, in the 
words of Dickson J. (as he then was), "compelling reasons" existed.74 Such a move was not surpris-
ing, given that the Court was led at the time by Chief Justice Bora Laskin who had long been criti-
cal of the strict approach to stare decisis practiced in the Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, as well as of the fidelity that had been shown to English law over the creation of 
uniquely Canadian precedents. By the time Brian Dickson became Chief Justice, presiding over the 
formative years of Charter jurisprudence in Canada, it became clear that the S.C.C. would not be 
bound by any strict formula in deciding whether to overrule its own decisions, particularly preChar-
ter ones. Beginning with his dissent in Bernard v. The Queen,75 Dickson C.J. recognized at least four 
factors that tended to favour overruling, including (1) whether the precedent is consistent with the 
Charter, (2) whether it has been attenuated by subsequent cases, (3) whether it creates uncertainty, 
and (4) in a criminal case, whether it operates to the detriment of accused persons.76 In R. v. 
Chaulk,77 a majority of the court relied on these factors to overrule Schwartz v. The Queen78 on the 
meaning of the word "wrong" in the insanity (now mental disorder) defence. 
33  Two years ago, in R. v. Henry,79 the Supreme Court was called upon to reconsider a line of cases 
interpreting s. 13 of the Charter, the right against selfincrimination. The cases, Dubois v. The 
Queen,80 R. v. Mannion ,81 R. v. Kuldip,82 and R. v. Noel,83 all dealt with various aspects of whether 
and how an accused's prior statement or testimony could be used in a subsequent trial. In Henry, the 
two accused were convicted of first degree murder in a re-trial in which they were cross-examined 
on prior inconsistent testimony they had given at their first trial. Defence counsel asserted on appeal 
that the accused were entitled to protection by virtue of s. 13 from exposure to contradictory testi-
mony they had given voluntarily in the earlier trial. 
34  In rejecting this interpretation of s. 13, a unanimous Supreme Court in Henry overruled Man-
nion , a 19 year-old precedent, which had held that an accused could not be cross-examined on prior 
inconsistent testimony given at an earlier trial where the accused had testified voluntarily. The court 
also overruled in part Kuldip, a post-Mannion decision, in which it was held that an accused could 
only be cross-examined on such prior testimony where the purpose was to impeach credibility, 
rather than to incriminate the accused. The court in Henry took the view that the decisions in Man-
nion and Kuldip had strayed from the purpose of s. 13 which was first recognized in Dubois, 
namely to "protect individuals from being indirectly compelled to incriminate themselves."84 Those 
decisions had not drawn any distinction between being confronted in crossexamination by prior 
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compelled evidence (where the accused is entitled to protection by s. 13) and being confronted with 
prior testimony given by the accused voluntarily at his or her own trial (where the accused is not 
entitled to protection from "self-incrimination" by s. 13). They had erred in treating both compelled 
and voluntary testimony as equally deserving of protection, and drawing an unworkable distinction 
in Kuldip between cross-examination to impeach and crossexamination to incriminate. 
35  The court in Henry acknowledged that it "should be particularly careful before reversing a 
precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter protection."85 In the result, it overruled one aspect 
of the case law that has been beneficial to the accused (the Mannion rule that an accused could not 
ordinarily be cross-examined on prior voluntary testimony) and one aspect that had been favourable 
to the Crown (the Kuldip rule permitting cross-examination on all prior testimony provided it was 
used to impeach credibility, rather than to incriminate the accused). According to Binnie J., "[t]he 
result of a purposeful interpr etation of s. 13 is that an accused will lose the Mannion advantage in 
relation to prior volunteered testimony but his or her protection against the use of prior compelled 
testimony will be strengthened."86 [emphasis added]. 
36  In a manner consistent with other S.C.C. decisions in the last decade of the Charter era, the court 
in Henry did not spend much time explaining its ability to overrule its own precedents, beyond not-
ing that there were three "compelling reasons" to overrule in this case.87 The first compelling reason 
was the court's view that Mannion had adopted an interpretation of s. 13 that was inconsistent with 
that provision's purpose. A second compelling reason was said to be the unworkability of the Kuldip 
distinction between cross-examination to incrim inate and cross-examination to impeach, a conclu-
sion that was only reached after experience trying to implement it. In fact, both the Crown and de-
fence in Henry acknowledged the problematic nature of this distinction, although they disagreed 
about the solution to that problem88 (the Crown wanted more fre edom to crossexamine the accused, 
while the defence wanted virtually none). Finally, the third compelling reason was said to be the 
unfair dilution of s. 13 protection against subsequent use of compelled testimony by the decision in 
earlier cases to lump it in together with testimony given by the accused voluntarily, and therefore 
permitting some cross-examination on it with the real potential for incrimination. 
37  While the Supreme Court stated in Henry that its practice is "against departing from precedents 
unless there are compelling reasons to do so" and that such departures are "rare",89 the reality is that 
compelling reasons have been found quite regularly in the post-Charter era.90 This is not to suggest 
that overruling pr evious decisions now thought to be incorrect is inappropriate. The reality is that it 
is sometimes difficult to predict in advance that a newly articulated approach or principle will be 
unworkable or lead to unintended consequences or inequities. It is preferable that the court squarely 
face up to these challenges and admit error or unworkability where it is evident, rather than to dis-
tinguish cases on spurious or technical grounds or continue to apply a law thought to be unjust. 
 
2.  Provincial appellate courts 
38  The ability of intermediate courts of appeal (such as the Federal Court of Appeal and the various 
provincial appellate courts in Canada) to overrule their own precedents has been treated differently 
than that for final courts of appeal. A factor in favour of limiting the power to overrule is found in 
the fact that, unlike final courts of appeal, intermediate appellate courts generally do not sit en banc 
(with all members of the court), but rather in panels of three me mbers of a much larger court. If one 
panel of three members of the court was not bound to follow a decision of a different panel of three, 
the state of the law would be quite uncertain.91 
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39  The strictest approach to this power is that set out by the English Court of Appeal in Young v. 
Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.92 In Young, Lord Greene M.R., on behalf of the Court, held that, subject 
to three exceptions, the Court of Appeal was bound by its own previous decisions. Those exceptions 
were (1) when faced with a previous conflicting decision of the Court of Appeal it could choose 
which to follow, (2) when a previous decision had been impliedly overruled by a subsequent deci-
sion of the House of Lords, and (3) when a decision of the Court of Appeal was given per incuriam, 
it need not be followed. Over the years, a few other exceptions have been added, such as that the 
strict approach to stare decisis does not apply where the liberty of the subject is at issue, such as in 
criminal cases,93 but the ability to overrule itself remains quite limited. 
40  Until quite recently, most provincial appellate courts in Canada did not consider themselves 
bound by horizontal stare decisis in a manner similar to the English Court of Appeal. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal was the exception, having taken the view, at least in civil matters, that it ought not 
to overrule its own decisions, even those thought to be wrong.94 Writing in 1978, George Curtis at-
tributed the intermediate appellate courts' relative level of comfort with overruling their own prece-
dents to such factors as the enormous geographic scope of Ca nada and the reality that these courts 
were the de facto courts of last resort for the vast majority of cases coming before them.95 For exam-
ple, in a 1975 decision,96 Freedman C.J.M. made clear his willingness to overturn precedent in ap-
propriate cases: 
 
 Let me at once express my belief that we do not lack the power to d epart from 
an earlier decision of this Court. It is a power that will of course be exercised 
only in rare circumstances. But if the circumstances are deemed appropriate and 
we are convinced that the earlier decision was incorrect we should be guided by 
the principle that it is no part of the function of any Court to make error perpet-
ual.97 
41  However, in John Deere v. Firdale Farms Ltd.,98 both the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal seemed to take a more restrictive view, citing Young v. Bristol Aero-
plane. The court sat a five-person panel and a majority of three justices overruled the court's earlier 
decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. J.I. Case Canada Inc.99 However, in doing so, Twaddle J.A. 
seemed to approve of the Young approach, while relying on the "rare" exception from postYoung 
cases to the effect that a decision of an intermediate court of appeal could be considered per incu-
riam and need not be followed where it was "demonstrably wrong" or made in "manifest error."100 
Apparently gone is the more relaxed approach of Freedman C.J.M. that an earlier decision could be 
overruled if considered simply incorrect. (unclear here, for is not Twaddle using the mistake doc-
trine?) The two dissenting justices, O'Sullivan and Huband JJ., both of whom had decided Royal 
Bank of Canada, took a similarly restrictive view of the power to overrule, while also taking excep-
tion to the characterization of their earlier decision as "manifestly wrong." Huband J.A. stated, "[i]f 
Royal Bank v. Case was not a decision per incuriam, then it should be followed no matter what the 
individual views of the judges on this panel might be."101 O'Sullivan J.A. took the view that the 3-2 
decision in John Deere to depart from Royal Bank of Canada represented only a "conflicting deci-
sion of this court" and noted that "future courts would have to choose between" the two conflicting 
authorities.102 
42  In Mellway v. Mellway,103 Monnin J.A. stated that a precedent of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
can only be overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada or by a five-person panel of the court. This 
"panel of five" convention appears to have originated in British Columbia,104 but has since been 
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adopted in other provinces,105 on the basis that a three-person panel is simply disagreeing with, rather 
than overruling, a previous decision.106 However, there remains some dispute about whether a three-
person panel is empowered to overrule a precedent on the limited Young v. Bristol Aeroplane 
grounds (per incuriam, etc.), leaving the five-person panel for overruling on substantive grounds for 
incorrectness. For example, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. British Columbia (Labour Rela-
tions Board),107 a three-person panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that "a three-
judge panel may decline to follow a previous decision of the Court in certain circumstances," which 
includes, at least, where the per incuriam rule applies.108 
43  It should be noted that the Federal Court of Appeal has adopted a similar approach to overruling 
its own precedents, as exemplified in the following passage from a 1997 decision: 
 
 although a decision of one panel of this court is not binding on another, it is in-
correct to speak of a recent decision overruling an earlier one. The accepted rules 
of stare decisis dictate that both decisions are of equal weight. It is true that with 
the passage of time an earlier decision may fall into disfavour and, thus, lose its 
persuasiveness through application of various well-known judicial techniques. It 
is equally true that on occasion one panel expressly disapproves of an earlier de-
cision where the principal author of that decision or the majority of that panel is 
now sitting on the subsequent case. More often than not the earlier decision was 
rendered from the bench or was decided per incuriam. Aside from these circum-
stances, the formal means for overruling an ea rlier decision is to have the Court 
strike an enlarged panel, as may be done where there are two conflicting deci-
sions of the Court, or conflicting lines of authority, and the issue involved is 
deemed to be of fundamental significance to the jurisprudence in a particular area 
of federal law.109 
44  This brings us to R. v. Neves,110 the 2005 decision of a five-person panel of the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal, in which a 3-2 majority overruled R. v. Garoufalis.111 Garoufalis had held that ability to 
pay was irrelevant to the court's consideration of whether to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture under 
s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code. Steel and Freedman JJ.A. for the majority112 cited with approval 
the view of Monnin J.A. in Mellway that a five-member panel is required for a "direct rejection" of 
a previous decision of the court.113 They also cited Freedman C.J.M. in General Brake & Clutch for 
the proposition quoted above, namely that the court should not perpetuate its own errors.114 The ma-
jority in Neves went on to adopt the approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in David Polowin 
Real Estate v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.115 for situations where neither the per in-
curiam nor the "manifest slip or error" exceptions to stare decisis applies. In such cases where the 
appellate court nevertheless believes the precedent to be wrong, it should 
 
 weigh the advantages and disadvantages of correcting the error...focus[ing] on 
the nature of the error, and the effect and future impact of either correcting it or 
maintaining it. In doing so, this approach not only takes into account the effect 
and impact on the parties and future litigants but also on the integrity and ad-
ministration of our justice system.116 
45  Having unanimously overruled a four year-old precedent in David Polowin, it is now clear that 




46  The real benefit of such the more principled, functional approach can be found in the fact that it 
does not require judges who believe a precedent to be wrong to shoehorn their decision to overrule 
into one of the limited exceptions such as those enumerated in Young and its progeny.117 Laskin J.A. 
refused to decide David Polowin on the basis of a number of limited and technical exceptions to 
stare decisis put forward by the insurers. Those exceptions included the per incuriam rule, the 
proposition that stare decisis does not apply to the interpr etation of contracts, the argument that the 
instant appeal involved a different question than the precedent, and a purported "special circum-
stances" exception.118 Instead, the Ontario Court of Appeal in David Polowin and the majority of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal in Neves undertook a more transparent, pragmatic attempt to consider 
how the values promoted by adherence to precedent on the one hand, and by error correction on the 
other, actually play out on the facts of the case. Both decisions cited the criteria from Chaulk and 
other S.C.C. decisions favouring overruling a precedent (including consistency with Charter values, 
attenuation by later decisions of the court, uncertainty caused by the precedent, and whether the 
overruling would be favourable to the accused). However, the nature of the cost-benefit analysis 
opened up other factors for consideration, such as whether decisions of other courts of appeal across 
the country contradict the precedent, whether the broader issues at stake are likely to recur in the 
future, whether there has been significant reliance on the precedent, whether the precedent is of re-
cent vintage ("better then to correct an error early than to let it settle in"119), and whether the panel 
has the benefit of legislative history that the earlier court did not. 
47  Unlike the decision in David Polowin, Neves was not unanimous. The two dissenting justices 
(Huband and Monnin JJ.A.) were strongly of the view that "to maintain the principle of stare decisis 
in the circumstances of this case is the paramount consideration. If that principle can be side-
stepped in this case, then the principle is eroded beyond recognition."120 Significantly, they did not 
disa pprove of the approach in David Polowin. However, they argued that any factors favouring re-
consideration of Garoufalis were trumped by the fact that the fiveperson court in the instant appeal 
could not agree that the precedent was wrongly decided121 and that it is unprecedented for a divided 
court to overrule a unanimous decision simply on the basis that it was wrong.122 
48  Ideally, every decision to overrule a precedent would be unanimous. However, Canadian courts 
do not require unanimity for a decision to be considered binding. In the end, the substantive issue in 
Neves was resolved by the Supreme Court of Canada in its decision on a related appeal, R. v. Lavi-
gne,123 in a manner that overruled the majority decision from Manitoba. The high court interpreted 
the relevant provision of the Code differently from both the majority and dissenting opinions in Ne-
ves, although in result closer to the dissent than to the majority.124 This does not necessarily mean 
that the majority in Neves should not have ruled as it did. However, since it was already known that 
the Supreme Court of Canada would be pronouncing on the issue in Lavigne, the argument for over-
ruling the precedent to clarify the law in the province for future cases (a key factor in David 
Polowin) could not be relied on in Neves.125 On this point, the Ontario Court of Appeal had said the 
following: 
 
 I do not think that this court should be less willing to depart from its own deci-
sions because the Supreme Court of Canada, our country's final court, can correct 
errors made by a provincial appellate court. For people in Ontario, the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario is the final court in the vast majority of cases. The Supreme 
Court grants leave rarely and does not ordinarily do so simply because it consid-
ers a provincial appellate court deci sion to be wrong. More is required to obtain 
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leave--the case must raise an issue of public or national importance...If we dis-
miss these appeals because of stare decisis, it is not obvious that the appellants 
will obtain leave to appeal to our highest court.126 
Therefore, it seems that we have come full circle to an approach remarkably similar to that de-
scribed by George Curtis and Justice Freedman in the 1970s, where the likelihood (or not) that the 
Supreme Court of Canada will correct errors is a factor in favour of permitting greater latitude for 
provincial courts of appeal to overrule their own decisions. It seems that the liberal, functional ap-
proach to overruling in provincial courts of appeal is gaining momentum at a pace similar to the Su-
preme Court's increasing comfort level with overruling its own precedents now thought to be wrong 
or unworkable. However, there are still strong voices in favour of a more restrained approach. 
 
3.  Trial courts 
49  With respect to the horizontal convention of precedent at the trial level, the dominant approach 
is that, while not strictly binding, applicable decisions of the same court should be followed as a 
matter of judicial comity, unless certain circumstances exist.127 A leading decision is Re Hansard 
Spruce Mills,128 in which Wilson J. of the B.C. Supreme Court expressed the matter in these terms: 
 
 I have no power to override a brother judge. I can only differ from him, and the 
effect of my doing so is not to settle but rather to unsettle the law, because, fol-
lowing such a difference of opinion, the unhappy litigant is confronted with con-
flicting opinions emanating from the same Court and therefore of the same legal 
weight.129 
50  Wilson J. went on to say that a judge should only decline to follow a decision of the same court 
if (1) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the previous decision, (2) it is demonstrated 
that some binding precedent or relevant statute was not considered (i.e., the decision was per incu-
riam), or (3) the judgment was not considered (i.e., it was given as an immediate decision without 
opportunity to consult authority).130 
51  Having said that, Manitoba judges have on occasion treated previous decisions of their col-
leagues as binding.131 A relatively recent example is the decision of Morse J. in Paul v. Manitoba 
(Chief Electoral Officer)132 involving a Charter challenge to the prohibition on prisoner voting in 
provincial elections.133 The case arose in somewhat unusual circumstances. Prisoners at Stony 
Mountain Penitentiary had successfully challenged the prisoner voting ban in provincial legislation 
in a decision before Scollin J. in 1986.134 However, with only a short time before the provincial elec-
tion, the court declined to order the Chief Electoral Officer to actually make prisoner voting a real-
ity. The prisoners' appeal of that remedial decision was denied by the Court of Appeal (it was 17 
hours before the polls opened). The Attorney General then filed an appeal but did nothing to prose-
cute it for two years. In the mean time, the same prisoners (Arnold Badger and others) brought an 
action challenging the constitutionality of the federal prisoner voting ban. In that case, Hirschfield J. 
declared the federal law unconstitutional,135 but an appeal to the Manitoba Court of Appeal was al-
lowed, upholding the federal voting ban as valid.136 In a separate pr oceeding, the Court of Appeal 
refused to exercise its discretion to revive the appeal of the Scollin J. decision concerning the valid-
ity of the provincial voting ban.137 It was with this background that Paul was heard and the first 
Badger decision followed (i.e., the provincial voting ban was declared invalid), notwithstanding the 
C.A. decision in the second Badger case which had upheld the federal voting ban and had arguably 
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cast doubt on the first Badger decision. In response to the argument that he should consider "Badger 
No. 1" impliedly overruled by the Court of Appeal decision in "Badger No. 2," Morse J. said the 
following: 
 
 In my judgment, however, I do not have the right or authority to declare valid 
legislation which another judge of this court has declared to be of no force or ef-
fect or invalid by reason of inconsistency with the Charter. If this is to be done, it 
must, in my opinion, ...be done by the Court of Appeal.138 
52  Such an approach to following trial level decisions seems anomalous, and may have been 
adopted by the court due to the nature of the issue, namely upholding a Charter right that had been 
vindicated in the earlier case. On the other hand, there are examples of trial judges (at the provincial 
court and superior court level) taking the view that they are free to depart from a decision of the 
same court,139 often citing the words of Lord Goddard C.J. in Police Authority for Huddersfield v. 
Watson:140 
 
 I think the modern practice, and the modern view of the subject, is that a judge of 
first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of 
first instance, unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a 
matter of judicial comity. He certainly is not bound to follow the decision of a 
judge of equal jurisdiction. He is only bound to follow the decisions which are 
binding on him, which, in the case of a judge of first instance, are the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Divisional Court.141 
53  With the high number of trial judges at work in a given jurisdiction (for example, the Ontario 
Superior Court has over 250 members), a plethora of conflicting decisions is undesirable. However, 
it is also well-known that trial judges often do not have the benefit of full argument and case law on 
the legal matters they must decide. As such, the dominant approach is that articulated in Re Hansard 
Spruce Mills, and is generally understood to be based on the idea of nonbinding comity (i.e., respect 
for opinions of the same court) with freedom to depart for good re ason. However, some judges 
seem to treat the notion of comity as essentially binding them to follow the previous decision,142 
while others consider themselves free to disagree with a previous decision (for they cannot be un-
derstood to "overrule" it) if they think it incorrect.143 As suggested by Esau, the uncertainty in regard 
to the horizontal precedent at the trial court level is unsatisfactory.144 Borrowing a page from the ap-
pellate decisions in David Polowin in Neves, we may start to see an effort made by trial judges to 
weigh the benefits and disadvantages of following previous decisions of the same court. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
54  In a recent article entitled "Advocacy in Jurisprudential Appeals,"145 Justice Rosalie Abella cited 
Iacobucci J. for the proposition that "laws get changed when the court thinks the law needs incre-
mental changes to 'bring legal rules into step with a changing society.' In other words, judges make 
law reluctantly and infrequently, legislatures do it for a living. This I think, is how most judges 
feel."146 Don Stuart has suggested that precedent is only one of the "working ingredients" of judicial 
decision-making, particularly at the Supreme Court of Canada level, "achiev[ing] a compromise be-
tween a goal of certainty and predictability and one of flexibility."147 The recent treatment of prece-
dent in Canada, particularly the horizontal convention, seems to confirm this view. On the other 
hand, we have seen the Supreme Court of Canada take a stricter view than some would like to the 
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vertical convention of precedent, particularly the precedential value of "authoritative obiter" from 
that court. 
55  A more flexible, functional approach to precedent arguably discourages a kind of formalistic 
reasoning that may result if judges are not permitted to consider the merits of a particular rule, as 
well as a tendency to "find another way around" a problematic precedent, rather than to address it 
forthrightly. After all, judging requires judgment, which means considering the admittedly slippery 
concept of whether justice is done by maintaining or changing a legal rule.148 Huband J.A. in Neves 
has correctly observed that the doctrine of stare decisis is being eroded not, I would suggest, "be-
yond recognition," but eroded nonetheless. Some of the trends discussed here represent a challenge 
to the traditional view that a later panel of a given court should not be free to substitute its doctrinal 
preferences or views for that of the first panel to decide the matter. As Bruce Harris has noted, in 
arguing for a principled approach to horizontal overruling, "there would appear to be no reason why 
the doctrinal disposition of the earlier court should automatically prevail over that of the later 
court."149 Stability, consistency, and protection of reliance interests are all important institutional 
values promoted bythe doctrine of stare decisis. Recent appellate decisions signal a shift toward a 
greater focus on exactly how those values play out on the facts before the court, rather than in an 
abstract sense. Such a principled and functional approach is welcome. 
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